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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the characteristics of districts 
in Kenya which determine the ratio of men to women in the age bracket 
20-4®, It is argued that thig ratio is an index of one prominent 
type of migratign in Kenya. 
Employment opportunities, the state of smallholder 
agriculture* education, and land Oy/nerghip patterns, are all found 
to be significant in determining the "working age sex ratio." 
It is suggested that policy will effectively deal with 
migration only when It addresses itself to the regional inequalities 
in opportunity which underlie migration. 
The analysis us?6 statistical multiple regression 
techniques. An appendix with data accompanies the discission. 
Internal migration between regions of low income countries 
has been the focus of considerable research in recent years. 
Migration from rural to urban areas has been of particular interest for 
researchers and policy makers because the^nigh rate of urban growth 
has put a serious gtrain on urban services and housing. Attempts to 
determine the forces which contribute to migration, therefore, may 
provide insights into the potential success of policies which aim to 
modify migration patterns. 
In many ways migration can be an economically and 
socially productive activity, When people leave areas in which their 
opportunities are limited and ma<e use of better opportunities 
elsewhere, their lot is improved. Although migration between rural 
areas may give rise to ethnic and other social tensions, these costs 
must be weighed against the benefits provided by putting people in e. 
position to generate income for themselves. Migration of this type 
is likely to be socially beneficial in many cases. 
However migration can give rise to other problems. 
Emigrants can be expected to contribute more to their society than 
.j. 
they remove through consumption. This is true, in every case where 
a community as a whole benefits from its members. Since migration 
is likely tq involve ambitious p.nd well trained individuals — those 
who can benefit most from movirc —- the community they leave will lose 
their talents. A significant -art of the gain of the in-migration 
area may be a loss to the out - nigration area when the 'demonstration 
effect" of.the migrants' potentid. successes are lost to the "donor" 
community«• Thus the relative backwardness of an area< which leads., to 
out-migration, is likely to be reinforced by the very process of 
migration. . This is''part of the Itrger process which has been called 
the "development of u'nder-devclopnet." Such development, in which the 
"centre" gains at.the expense of the "periphery", is most acute in 
the ease of rurnl-urban migration. 
Rural-Urban migration in a country like Kenya is likely "-
to create great problems. A significant proportion of this migration 
'probably Results in a "dead weicrht loss" to society. 'This occurs: 
• 
when a person leaves rural work to stay if a town and search for a job. 
Many migrants leave rural opoortunities wi^ n. relatively little chance 
of getting an urban job. ' More people migrate than are in fac^ 
able to find work in urban areas. Although aech migrant may have low 
productivity in rural areas, it is likely that the total output lost 
through urban uremployment is not trivial. 
In any case, whether desireable or not, migration is likely 
to be viewed as a political' problem because it makes visible social 
inequalities and tensions. 
Why Do People Migrate? 
In -a profound sense it 'might be said that people's economic 
and social conditions compel them to migrate; but.in a more narrow sense, 
individuals -make decisions to migrate. . What determines such decisions? 
Opinions and theories on this issue vary.. . At one ex^eme, economists' 
models place almost complete emphasis on "rational" decision making to 
maximize.the present value of income, Potential migrants base their 
decisions on the difference between income streams ;the cost of moving, 
and on the likelihood of employment in each location. Well paying 
jpbs attract more, applicants than can be accepted, until the large 
number of competing job seekers discourages further migration. 
A^the other extreme, almost, mystic models of the "pull of 
the city".can be found. In such discussions (which are more often 
casual than r4gourous), drift.to towns is seen as practically inevitable, 
reflecting not: so much historical as psychological imperatives. Such 
discussions cannot really be called "theories" of rural-urban migration 
because they, explain any level? of thesE phenomena. ,. If migration is 
determined .purely by "values" which have no root in material conditions, 
then anything can be explained ex—post—facto.. 
Between these extreme positions, various other influences 
on the decision to migrate have been allowed. In particular, the role 
of education and population pressure on the :lahd have been suggested 
as important determinants of migration. Both these variables can.be 
interpreted as"acting through, income differentials and can therefore 
be reconsiled with the economic model. A high man-land ratio would certainly 
be expect3d to reduce returns- tc .labour. Alternatively, a consentrated 
pattern of land ownership coupled with less labour intensive technology 
on large scale holdings could have the same effect. Thus population 
pressure i& certainly consistent' with a picture of migration determined 
fundamentally by economic-opportunities. Education too, by increasing 
the range.of jobs to which a person has access, can have its effect 
through income. However, It is entirely possible that education has 
an effect-beyond its impact on potential earnings.. Attitudes and 
values surely are modified-by the. education process.. Moreover, an 
eetecerfced person would be more likely to be able to cope with problems 
fof'urbah~life, for which literacy is certainly an advantage. I Other approaches to predicting migration, not based on the 
^individual decision to migrate, have met with some, predictive success... 
Gravitation models, in which distance and "mass" [population size) 
^ determine migration patterns between areas have, been used. So too 
have models in which current migration is taken to be a function of 
cumulative'past migration. Like the "majic of the city" model, however, i '' thpse models are deficient in that they have no concrete behavioural 
bas^ which is subject to policy. Neither the distance between areas, 
n'Or' their "populations, nor the history of migration between them can 
be manipulated by a planner. To-the extent that migration is 
a phenomenon which is sensitive to potential policies, we need models 
.which .treat policy instruments explicitly. 
The Approach in this Study. 
In this study we do not -look at characteristics of 
individuals who migrate but rather at characteristics of districts. 
We analyse the relationship between gharacteristics of these districts 
and an "indirect measure of migration, the sex ratio for the ages 
20 to 40 . The analysis covers 22 districts in Kenya, including 
8^-of. the population outside Nairobi and Mombasa and all major 
small—holder districts. j 
We propose that there are two major types of migration 
in Kenya, apart from short term movements (to markets, etc.) 
While wq suspect that almost all migration is in response to the 
same fundamental conditions — lack of opportunities in the 
out-migration relative to the in-migration region — we suggest that 
the characteristics of migrants and their behaviour will consentrate 
in two categories. Some hypothesized characteristics of these two 
types of migration are set out in Table I below. \ 
\ \ 
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TABLE I. 
"SETTLEMENT" MIGRATION "CASH" MIGRATION 
UNIT "FAMILY" (SEX RATIO OF) 
MIGRANTS ( .9-1.1 ) 
"INDIVIDUALS", 
ESPECIALLY YOUNG*=fcBN 
(SEX RATIO OF. MIGRANTS 
1.5-2 AND UP) 
OBJECTIVE 
LAND; HIGH INCOME -
EMPLOYMENT; SELF 
EMPLOYMENT 
CASH, ESPECIALLY JIN 
LOW WAGE EMPLOYMENT 
PERCEPTION 
OF 
"HOME" 
WEAK; TIES TO 
IN-MIGRATION REGION 
STRONG; TIES TO 
OUT-MIGRATION REGION 
PROBLEMS 
RESULTING FROM 
MIGRATION 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
IN RURAL IN-MIGRATION 
REGIONS 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF 
RURAL OUTMIGRATION 
REGIONS; URBAN 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
This brief summary consists of generalizations which could use further 
discussion. "Family" and "individual" are ill defined terms in Kenya 
(for an economist in particular) since kinship' and age group bonds are still 
very extensive. ..It would be absurd to suggest thst one sort of migration 
preserves traditional kinship relation while the other disolves them. 
The idea behind the terms is simply that "settlement" migration involves men, 
women, and children, while "cash" migration is likely to involve predo-
minantly young men and to a lesser degree young women and older men. 
"Settlers" view, their move as permanent, although we:suspect that their 
loyalties to the new areas are weak. "Cash" migrants identify, strongly 
with their regions of origin and look upqn their destination principally ;: 
as a place to earn money to be devoted to expenditures "back home". 
We suspect that relatively few migrants, view themselves as'permanently 
alienated from the land. Economic realities in Kenya suggest, however, 
that increasing numbers of migrants will have to work for increasing 
numbers of years to earn enough to buy land, all in a context of diminishing 
likelihood of finding wage .jobs. Thus an urban proletariat will emerge 
in spite of few peoplers desire tc- join it. This class will be augmented 
by second generation immigrants in the city. (See V. Elkan for another 
discussion of this question £ 2 J . ) 
In view of the cash migrants' desire to devote their cash 
incomes to developments "back home", it may seem inconsistent to predict 
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that underdevelopment of the "home" region will be a result of 
cash' migration; Indeed, the alternative hypothesis, that 
-accellerated ..development of 'the home areas will result,.-cannot 
be.rejected out of hand. We expect that the net effect of cash-migration 
on the .home-area-will be-negative, -however,-..because we'expect that 
the -potential, contributions of the- migrants to their .communities.,--
particularly in terms of their- leadership..in innovations-would. be 
greater ithan-the-value of tbeir cash' remittances 
- In this study we. are unable to test all the-conjectures 
- stated-above. Most , of aur effort-has-been-devoted to looking at 
evidence which may throw-light orrthe causes of "cash" migration„••• 
Let us. .precede thai.-discussion.*,-however with a look, at some- evidence 
•about the-two-types-of migration drawn from Kenya's four largest 
• ethnic - groups*- - ..... .  — '..;•' 
Table'2 shows the number of resident, "by--sex, ..of each 
of these ethnic groups.in the-provinces of Kenya outside their 
- "heartland." Also .included.-are the populations of Nairobi and 
'Mombasa of these groups. -
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TABLE 2 ( 100's of People) 
KEKUYU LUO LUYIA KAMBA 
A. CENTRAL MALE 
PR0T7. FEMALE -
53 
28 
55 
' 32 
134 
106 
B. NTANZA M 
F 
36 
23 
155 
135 
8 
4 
C. WESTERN M 
F 
59 
51 
96 
105 
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3 
D. EASTERN M 
F 
138 
108 
20 
12 
15 
"9 
-
E. RIFT M 1724 430 822 83 
F . 1690 262 668 54 
F. COAST M 
(LESS 
MOMBASA) 
31 
15 
59 27 
16 
151 
' 134 
G. NORTH-
EASTERN M 
F 
6 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
H. TOTAL 
A-G M 
F 
1994 nr. 660 = 1.50 1075 =1.25 389 = 1.28 
1888 " 441 861 303 
I. MOMBASA M p 94 55 
131 
90 
92 
SO 
193 
101 
J. NAIROBI M 
F 
1131 
783 | 
1 
377 
252 
401 
250 
412 
195 
K. TOTAL 
I.J. M 
F 
1225 =1.45 
838 
5D8 =1.49 
342 
493 1.59 
310 
605 = 2.04 
296 
L. TOTAL M 
H.K. 
3220 , ,R 
2725 = 1 , 1 8 = 1.49 782 1568 =1.34 1171 
994 = 1.66 
599 
TABLE 2 (Cont'd). 
KIKUYU LUO LUYIA KAMBA 
M. NON-CITY/ 
TOTAL 
oirr 6S/o 5£P/c 71°/o 43/o 
N. OUT/TOTAL 
THIS GROUP 2% 15$ 13/° 
0. OUT/TOTAL 
ALL GROUPS 
OUT iafo P^/o 13/c 
NOTES TO TABLE 2: 
A, - L, "Heartlands" are defined as Central Province, Nyanza Province, 
Western Province plus part of Siaya, and Eastern Province respectively 
for the four ethnic groups. 
M. Total male plus female from row H, divided by male plus female from row L, 
for each column. 
N. Total male plus female row L. divided by entire Kenya population of 
this group. 
0. Total male; and female row L. divided by total for all groups row L. 
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We expect that most of the people in Nairobi and Mombasa are cash 
migrants,-while a larger proportion of the migrants in the less 
urbanized areas are settler migrants. Except for the case 
of Luo migrants, the sex ratio is substantially higher for each 
ethnic group in the "rural" setting (row H) compared to the "urban" 
setting (row K), This result is consistent with our expectation. 
Looking more carefully at the Luo case, it turns out that Kericho, Nakuru 
and Nandi districts are the principle destinations of the migrants. 
It is likely that most of these Luo migrants are cash .migrants: 
many small holders in Kericho and Nandi employ Luos, while settlement 
on the land by Luos is not widespread in these districts; in Nakuru, 
i urban jobs may be the magnet. 
Table 2 suggests that each type of migration constitutes 
a substantial proportion of the total. Among Kikuyus, who make" 
up almost half of the total migrants from these groups, almost 
two thirds of the migrants live outside the two major cities. 
Among Luyias, over of all migrants are outside these cities. 
Particularly when we consider that Nyandarua has been treated as 
part of the Kikuyu heartland, so that migration to there is 
ignored in Table 2, we feel it is reasonable to guess that somewhere 
between one half and two thirds of all migration in Kenya's recent 
past (to the census year of 1959) has been settlement migration. 
This proportion is probably a declining proportion of current 
migration since government sponsored settlement has declined very 
much. 
In the analysis which follows, we employ a methodology 
which by its very nature is limited to cash migration. We think, 
however, that the essential forces motivating both types of migration 
are similar and hence we do not rule out the more general applicability 
of our conclusions. 
Methodology 
The basic dependent variable for this analysis, 
as we have mentioned, is not a direct measure of migration but is 
rather the sex ratio (males to females) for the age group 20-40. 
We assume that this variable is a good index of the net importance 
of cash migration in the district, Two attributes of this measure 
should be pointed out. First, it can only record net migration, not the 
composition of migration. Thus, for example, while Kisumu district 
gives evidence of being involved in relatively little net migration, 
there may be considerable migration out of as well" as into the 
district. Our index is insensitive to gross flaws. Secondly, 
to the extent that the migration patterns of young women differ 
markedly from district to district, our.measure will be incorrect. 
Figure 1 gives a picture of the age specific sex ratio 
profiles for several districts and for Kenya as" a whole,, The districts 
were chosen to illustrate cases of in-migration (Kericho), little net 
migration (Kisii), high out migration (Machakos) and extremely high 
out-migration (Siaya). It will be noted that the figure shows a sharp 
drop in the sex ratio for Kenya as a whole in the age group 25 - 29. 
This may well be a measurement error rather than a true phenomenon. 
Nevertheless the patterns " of variation for districts of Kenya is 
very wide and quite consistent. Until the age 20, variation is limited 
and curves cross each other frequently. Between the ages of 20 and 50 
striking and consistent variation appears, and for the age group 
above 50, the pattern is again more uniform. 
We have taken the sex ratio for the age group 20 - 40 
(the "working age sex ratio") as the basic dependent variable in 
our analysis. The 40-50 age bracket was excluded partly because we 
felt that the pattern among younger men would be more consistent and 
more trustworthy, and also because we feared that the sex ratio in 
Central Province districts would be distorted for older men as a result 
of the many deaths during the struggle for independence* (Nyeri district 
does in fact show a sharp decline in the sex ratio in the age bracket 
40 - 50.) 
To give a sense of the geographic pattern of working age 
sex ratios in Kenya, we have prepared a map. Because sex ratios for 
pastoral areas in Kenya appear to be substantially above those for other 
areas, we have adjusted the working age sex ratio by dividing by the 
over all sex ratio of the district, Thus, while Garissa, for example, 
has a working age sex ratio of 1.078 and Taita has a ratio of 0.890, 
Garissa's over all sex ratio is 1.165 while Taita's is 0.968. 
If we look at the working age sex ratio relative to the over all 
sex ratio for these two districts, we find that the two districts are 
almost equal, with Garissa at 0.925 (i.e., 1.078 - 1.165) and 
Taita at 0.920 (0.890 - 0.968) Both are near the Kenya average of v * 
0.917. The map, then, shows these adjusted.sex ratios for all 
districts. For the districts we analyse latter in depth, the adjusted 
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sex ratios are very highly correlated to the unadjusted sex ratios 
(r=.98 ]; the adjustment makes very little difference to this subset 
in the regression analysis as well. 
Let us turn now to the variables ws employ in this analysis 
to explain the. variation among working age sex ratios in Kenya. 
Although we hypothesized that economic conditions are essential to 
the migration pattern, we did net explicitly treat income data. 
This is not necessarily a disadvantage because no reliable income 
figures are available at the district level in Kenya, but more 
fundamentaly because no single income datum tells much of the economic 
story of a district. If. we assume broadly that economic opportunities 
within a district are important to the migration decision, then we 
must include various opportunities relevant to various classes within 
the population. Not only, wage jobs, but opportunities in small 
holder agriculture are important. These opportunities may depend upon 
land ownership patterns and1the availability of profitable cash crops. 
Only the income figure reflecting the local opportunities for a 
potential migrant would be relevant to his decision. laSTrtfe we do not 
know a-priori who these peoole are who are "on the margin" with respect 
to migration, we do not knov which income figure to use. Indeed, it 
is likely that different groups of potential migrants (i.e.", secondary 
school leavers, the landless, etc,) respond tc different elements 
of the local economic and social conditions when they decide to 
migrate. 
. We therefore attempted to get information 
about two'broad catagorice -of^economic opportunities: opportunities 
in enumerated wage jobs and opportunities reflected by the state" 
of small holder agriculture in a district. As far as we know, this 
is the only study of migration in Africa in which employment opportunities 
rather than income figures were used to describe economic opportunties. 
Ideally, relevant measures of both types of information should be 
included. Also considered in our analysis was pressure on the land in 
the district and the economic distance of the district center from 
Nairobi, Mombasa, or Kampala, (whichever was closest). Finally we 
considered education as a separate influence on the working age sex 
ratio. 
Both the data and. the statistical techniques used in the 
analysis are simple. The population census of 19©, the Statistical 
Abstract and the I.L,0. Report provided all the data used. . Ordinary 
i 
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least squares regressions procedures supplied the tools of analysis. 
Our data and techniques are both open to critisism. The data are 
in many, cases fairly unreliable. (For example, 50 square miles 
of paw-paw disappear from Kisumu district saall holder farms 
between the 1971 Statistical Abstract and the 1972 edition. Such 
a number — 14,000 hectares — is patently absurd. Thus all figures 
become suspect.) .The use cf ordinary least squares is also 
questionable since the interaction between the state of the small holder 
economy.and outmigration is almost certainly one in which each 
variable is both cause and effect. Thus a simultaneous model 
and more sophisticated estimating procedures would have been more 
appropriate. 
The justification for proceding as we have done is 
basically that it would have been much more costly in terms of 
both money and time to procede otherwise. With respect to the 
statistical techniques, any attempt correctly to specify the entire 
system of socio-economic interaction would have been so formidable 
that we ruled it out. Any partial analysis will give biased results. 
So we decided to keep the problem easily manageable. 
Results. 
Before entering a detailed analysis of the specific 
way in. which.we measured each variable and the relations between 
variables, let us summarize the basis results. 
1. Our independent variables together explain about 65/o 735/o 
of the total variation among working age sex ratios. 
(The exact R depends upon specification.) 
- 2. The availability of local enumerated job opportunities 
consistently explains a large proportion of total variance. 
Further analysis reveals that jobs on tea plantations and 
as school teachers (and, by inference, other government 
. jobs) are important in attracting migrants; jobs on sugar, 
coffee, and sisal plantations have no significant effect 
at all. 
3. Opportunities in small holder agriculture are also 
, significant in determining migration. 
'4. Education, at least at the primary level, encourages 
out migration. This result must be qualified, however. 
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Only when job opportunities were controlled for 
did education prove significant. Analysis of these 
results suggests that they occur because the local jobs 
created by primary education tend to act in the opposite 
direction from the :,pure" education effect. 
Thus no significant increase in migration is brought about 
by increasing the educational establishment; but if jobs 
were held constant and education were increased in-a 
district, out migration could be expected to increase, 
(in the longer run also, a stagnant stock of jobs with 
a continuing flow of students might have the effect of 
increasing migration.) 
5. Economic distance struggles to be significant in some 
specifications, but generally fails. This result may 
be due more to misspecification of "destination" than 
to a true relationship, 
6, We believe our results warrant the conclusion that land 
availability measured purely in terms of resources which 
"could" be exploited in a physical sense does not affect 
migration, but that the pressure on land measured in terms 
of ownership patterns (i.e., the proportion of holdings 
under one hectare) does affect migration. Thus, an area 
with relatively high physical pressure on the land but 
relatively few holdings of a very small size is likely 
to have less outmigration than another district with a 
larger proportion of tiny holdings but more land in 
all. This conclusion appears to be true in spite of a 
high corellation between physical land pressure and land 
ownership (r=.7). 
7. The linear form of the regression equations generally 
performed slightly bfetter than the log-linear forms. 
Since the constant in the linear form was always 
positive (setting othe^ 1 variables at their averages) 
this would suggest that all elasticities are declining 
functions of the independent variables. That is, the 
lower an independent variable, the more responsive 
. will be the sex ratio to changes in that variable. 
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8. The variation between "districts in Kenya with regard 
to all these variables appears to be very large., 
indeed. The working age sex ratio in the regression 
sample ranges from .53 (Siaya) to 1.20 (Kericho), 
or from about one young men for every two young women in 
Siaya to six young men for every five.young women in 
Kericho. In Nairobi this ratio is 1.93, or almost 
two young men for every young woman. The employment 
ratio varies also, from .0034 (one job for every 
300 inhabitants) in Siaya to .0937 (more than one 
job fr1". every eleven inhabitants) in Kiambu. 
The pi^ortion of small holder area in "subsistence" 
crops varies from over 7GP/o in several districts to 
under 29°/o in Nyandarua. The proportion of the population 
in primary school ranges from 7$ in Kwale to 24c/o in 
Nyeri. 
With the exception of education, each of the other 
variables promotes out-migration in the least advanced 
or privileged districts. Thus our results suggest that 
a very large proportion of total-variation in the working 
age sex rating-a-nd hence, by inference, in migration, 
is the result of regional inequalities in opportunities 
to earn a living. Inequalities in local opportunities 
in small holder agriculture and enumerated jobs explain 
between 5CP/o and 60$ of inter-district variation in 
working age sex ratios. The absence of plots of land 
of economic size, another aspect of inequality, in 
ownership, explains an additional 5 to 10 percent of 
the variation. It is thus roughly correct to assert variation in 
that i-two thirds of the^working age sex ratios in 
Kenya small holder districts is the result of unequal 
distribution of opportunities to earn income within 
and between districts. 
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Let us now examine these results in more detail. We shall 
consider the variables by type. We will begin with the ."core" regression 
result which we will then proceed to analyse in more detail. (For 
all regression results, Students t statistic appears in brackets.) 
(l) W = " 1 . 0 7 8 7 4 , 0 3 7 5 ^ E - .0038*8 - .0149^^d PJ2 = .663 
(7.93) .. (5.00) (2.13) (2.99) 
W = Working age sex ratio . 
E = Enumerated employment per capita 
S = Percent of small holder acres under subsistence crops. 
Ed = Pecent of population in primary schdtfl 
(#j = Significantly different from zero at'^ S0/; 
confidence level. 
* = Significantly different ^rom zero at 95$ 
confidence level. 
Enumerated Employment. -
Per capita enumerated employment within a district is working age 
the most significant variable affecting the^sex ratio of that' district. 
It.explains slightly less than half the variation between districts. 
The regression slope (which is much greater than the other slopes 
only because of units— elasticities for all variables are the 
same order of magnitude) suggests that an increase of one job per 
hundred people in the district will increase the sex ratio by about 
.04. An increase-of 10/0 in the number of jobs in.the "average" 
district should increase the sex ratio by one to two percent. 
We can divide the'jobs between urban and rural by taking 
the jobs in the major towns of Kenya and subtracting these, district 
by district,from the total- number of jobs in the district. If we now 
regress the sex ratio on both -sources of employment, we get a somewhat 
surprising result. 
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(2) W= 1.0770^ + 3,8915 EU + 4.0698^ER - .0037+S - .0148*Ed. 
(7,43) (1-19) (3.75) (2.00) (2.84) 
R2 = .661 
EU = urban employment per capita 
ER = rural employment per capita 
+ = significant at 90°/o confidence level 
We did not expect to find urban .job opportunities to be insignificant. 
Note however the similarity of the coefficients of the two types of 
employment. 
Pursuing the sources of rural employment, we can get more 
deeply into the effect of types of jobs on migration. We ran 
regression to explain the number of rural jobs in an area, 
(3) RJ = 1.6436+ ,2151'*T +..13Eo^C + .0653-^Su + .0174 Si + .0691^P 
(1.30) (10.28) (5.74) (3.77) (1.46) (3.38) 
R2= .943 
RJ = Rural jobs. . 
T = Hectares of Plantation tea (100's) 
C = Hectares of Plantation Coffee (100's) 
Su = Hectares of Plantation Sugar (100's) 
Si = Hectares of Plantation Sisal (100's) 
P = Number of Primary School students 
This surprisingly powerful regression suggests that tea, 
coffee, and sugar plantations, together with opportunities represented 
by the number of primary school pupils explain 94$> of the variation 
in the number of enumerated rural jobs. These jobs explain slightly 
less than half the variation in sex ratios. The coefficients appear 
plausible. The figures of 22, 14, and 6 employees per hectare for 
Tea, Coffee, and Sugar respectively (in June) can be checked. 
The insignificant result for sisal makes sense because most up country 
plantations were not in production in 1969. The figure of seven 
jobs per hundred primary school students is probably about twice as 
high as it should be, but it is definitely the right order of 
magnitude. Since other administrative and teaching jobs are probably 
closely corellated to the number of primary school students, we are 
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no doubt picking up some of these jobs in the coefficient for primary 
education.2 
We can now replace the figures for rural enumerated 
jobs with the figures for the sources of these jobs to analyse the 
effect on migration still further. 
(4) W = 1.0110^ + 1.2039^T + .0756C - .0184Su + .0230Si + 8.5982*EU 
(7.68) (3.45) (0.16) (0.07) (0.38) (2.41) 
- .0039+S - .0080 Ed R2 = .730 
(2.03) (1.11) 
The regression including only the subset of significant variables (plus 
education) yields. 
(5) W = 1.0689^ + 1.2306^1 + 8.4454^EU - .0041*S - ,0087+Ed 
(7.80) (4.49) (3.12) • (2.46) (1.76) 
R2= .718 
(it. should be noted that the plantation acres of various 
crops are entered on a per capita basis in regressions (4) 
and (5). This is done to make them consistent with the rural 
employment variable which they represent. Acreage, without 
population deflators,. gives similar results in terms of 
significance). 
These regressions suggest that not all rural jobs affect migration. 
Particularly dramatic is the case of coffee, which is highly 
significant in predicting jobs, but completely insignificant in its 
relation to the working age sex ratios. In fact, only tea, of all 
plantation crops, provides jobs which affect migration. The effect 
of teaching and other government jobs on migration cannot be 
evaluated explicitly, because our education variable would stand for 
both students and teachers. As we shall discuss shortly, this should 
explain the lower value of the coefficient of the Ed term and its in equations (4) and (5) lower significance^ Some other rural jobs are no doubt also picked 
up in the urban jobs coefficient in this equation, This coefficient 
has more than doubled compared to equation ( 2 ) . 
Since economic theories of migration often assume.that it 
is not -the stock of jobs, but the new job openings which affect the 
decision to migrate, .we also tried to test this variable. Here we 
encountered the dificulty that no information on job turnover was 
available. Thus we were forced to use the net rates of new job 
creation rather than the gross rate of job creation (net plus replacement) 
in our analysis,. 
The net rate of job creation turned out in fact to be 
utterly useless in predicting the sex ratio. This however 
constitutes jio real test of alternative formulation of the probability 
of getting a job, because the data are too crude to make a real test.^ " 
In fact, our regressions are only distantly related.to . 
strict theoretical models of unemployment so that it may be unwarranted 
to speculate on their applicability. Yet it is tempting to treat 
the different effects of different sorts.of rural, jobs on the sex 
ratio.as reflecting the rates of return to these jobs. The general 
assertion-that people.respond differently to different types of 
jobs in making migration decisions is certainly consistent with the 
results we have obtained. And this- assertion is a. close relative 
of the claim that the likelihood of getting a job plus the return •:.  
from that job are both important to the. migration decision. 
Small Holder Agriculture 
The major difficulty in assessing the effect of opportunities 
in small holder agriculture on the working age sex ratio is that the 
data for smallholder agriculture are so bad. Data on wage: employment, 
livestock holdings and land use are available, but they vary precipitously 
from year to year. As we mentioned earlier, the fluctuations and levels of 
figures are so absurd in some cases, that the basic understanding 
of some enumerators must be questioned. Moreover, data for the same 
period and the same district vary greatly from one edition of the 
Statistical Abstract to the next. Since no explanation of these 
changes are given, we can only surmise that someone "cleaned—up" 
the data to conform to an idea of what they should look like. Thus 
we are faced with the choice of data which contain a great deal of random 
error, or the "next edition" version which probably contain substantial 
bias. In fact, ever, the revised figures often look rather strange. 
The particular application of this data problem which we 
faced involved the Small Farm and Settlement Scheme Land Use survey 
for 19S9/70. Our analysis was conducted initially on the basis of the 
figures published in the 1971 Abstract. In the 1972 Abstract the data 
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are radically altered. Thus, for example, the percentage of • 
cultivated area under "subsistence" croDs in Kirinyaga'district 
increased from 42/= to ?ln/o between the two Abstracts. The revisions 
in the data between the two Abstracts increase the variance of ' 
our "subsistence" measure by over 70/0. 
In order to deal with.the data problem we tried a variety 
of measures of the conditions in small holder agriculture. In general, 
the variables which worked best contained a relatively broad "portfolio" 
of individual entries from the 1969/70 Land:Use .survey. These measures 
usually ho\ifered between the SO}' and the significance levels in 
our regressions. The coefficients were fairly stable when specification 
•was changed." Altogether, we believe that the status of small holder 
agriculture is significant determinant of the sex ratio, and that better 
measures of' the conditions in small holder agriculture would give 
better results. The cash earnings per-capita from the sale of smallholder 
crops ought to be a good measure of the "drawing-power" of a district. 
Such data can be generated for a number of crops, but the data are not 
easily accessible and thus the effort to use them was not mede for 
this study. 
Below is a table listing our measures of small holder agricultural 
development roughly in the order of their success in-predicting sex-
ratios in.our analysis. Also listed is the correlation coefficient 
of each measure with the/se^raiid^and some probable sources of 
error in.the measure. Needless to say the greatest source of 
difficulty is the unreliability of the figures themselves. 
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TABLE 3 
NAME OF MEASURE DEFINITION PROBLEMS WITH MEASURE CORRELATION 
SUBSISTENCE 1 
CEREALS EXCEPT WHEAT AND 
IMPROVED MAIZE; BEANS; 
CASSAVA; SWEET POTATO; 
YAIYT.ACRE/GE IN THESE CROPS 
AS # OF TOTAL CULTIVATION* 
1971+ 
CASSAVA CAN BE CASH 
CROP. 
>34 
SMALL HOLDER 
COFFEE, TEA 
SMALL HOLDER COFFEE 
AND TEA ACREAGE 
PER CAPITA 
1971 
BIASED TO HIGHLANDS 
-r „08 
SUBSISTENCE 3 
SAME AS SUBSISTENCE 
EXCEPT THAT COCONUTS 
AND CASHEW NUTS ARE 
EXCLUDED FROM TOTAL 
CULTIVATION 
i 1972 
EXCLUSION OF CROPS 
QUESTIONABLE 
,35 
SUBSISTENCE 2 SAME AS SUBSISTENCE 1 
BUT FROM 1972 
ABSTRACT 
MASSIVE UNEXPLAINED 
CHANSES FROM 1971 
SrAT» ABSTRACT. 
LARGE INCREASES 
IN COCONUT AND 
CASHEW ACREAGE HURT 
EFFICIENCY 
- .25 
SMALL HOLDER 
CASH CROPS 1 
WHEAT, COTTON, S/CANE, 
PYRETHRUM GROUND NUTS, 
IRISH POTATOES, 
VEGETABLES, COFFEE, 
TEA, COCONUTS, 
CASHEW/ NUTS AS % OF 
TOTAL CULTIVATION 
1971 
GREAT VARIABILITY 
IN YIELD PER ACRE. 
S/CANE, POTATOES, 
CABBAGES CAN BE 
SUBSISTENCE, OTHER 
CROPS CAN BE CASH 
CROPS. 
,15 
SMALL HOLDER 
CASH CROPS 2 
SMALL HOLDER COFFEE, 
TEA, PYRETHRUM, COTTON 
ACRE/SGE PER CAPITA 
1971 
GREAT VARIABILITY 
IN YIELD PER ACRE 
- <>20 
(WRONG SIGN) 
J . 
The I.L.O, Report measures, derived from Gwyer £ 4 : divide acres 
cultivated in certain crops by "Total Cultivation", We divide by 
"Aggregate' Area of Crdps." The difference is that Gwyer counts 
d'ouble-cropped' or inter-cropped areas once whereas we count them 
PS often as they are cropped:, Gwyer's measure has the disadvantage 
'that it can give rise to areas which rank high both in cash crop and 
{n subsistence crop density, which makes it difficult to rank areas 
|by "progressiveness." 
/Dates refer to the edition of the Statistical Abstract. 
/ reputedly for the same year, namely 1969/70. 
All data are 
/ 
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The basic regression result (equation (l) ) contains 
the result for the \zariatrle "Subsistence 1''. Of the .other measures,, 
both "Subsistence 3" and'"Small Holder Tea, Coffee" are significant 
at the 9Cf/a confidence" level 'when regressed on the working" age sex •"•" 
ratio in conunction with the employment'rate and education. The,-other-
measures are not significant above the 8CP/o level. 
We conclude, therefore that the state of small holder 
agriculture is a significant determinant "of the sex ratio. • If "better 
measures were available, we expect that they would show a stronger 
» 
tendency for out migration from areas with underdeveloped small 
hplder agriculture. 
Education 
Education can be expected to increass e person's mobility. 
Information, skills and perhaps also values are imparted by education 
which, turn a person's attention towards opportunities outside his 
home region. To test whether education does indeed have the expected ' • i effect, we would need to know the education level of the people who. 
are moving. By looking at characteristics of a district, however, 
\ 
we can see only what is the state of affairs after migration has 
taken place. ,Thus, for example, it would be misleading to look 
at the level of educational attainment of men in. the district.^ because, 
migrants would be excluded from out—migration ,regionsf and added into 
the population of in-migration regions. 
•J We tried two measures of education in the district. - On the 
assumption that education of males and females is closely correlated 
and that educated females are less likely to migrate than males, 
we tpok the-proportion of-females aged_20-40. with standard seven ' 
edi^ cation or above as a measure,of the level of education. Our 
second measure of education derived from the assumption that past " 
/and current levels of.education are closely correlated. If this 
assumption is correct, then the current proportion of the population -
in school should reflect the level of education for older pepple as 
well. On this assumption, then, we took the proportion of the population 
in primary school as our second measure of education. (Using population 
as the base the oroportion involves the effects of migration. 
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However, since outmigratipn would tend to raise the proportion and 
irv-migration to reduce it, these effects should reinforce the effect 
of education. They should bias the coefficient of the education 
variable away from zero rather than towards zero and thus increase 
its significance.) 
The proportion of females aged 20-40 with at least 
standard seven education was useless in predicting.the sex ratio. 
It consistently failed to give significant results, and the coefficients 
it did give varied in sign depending on the company they were in. 
We attribute this failure to the idea that female education probably 
is closely related to female migration, and thus the sex ratio is 
poorly predicted by a measure of eHucation dependent solely on female 
• 
education. 
Our other measure of education, the proportion of the 
population in primary school, was a much better predictor 
of the sex ratio. Although the simple correlation between the . 
sex ratio and this measure of education is quite small ? ), 
the measure performed well when employment opportunities were 
controlled.for in our multiple regression analysis. This is due, 
we believe., to the fact that education creates cash jobs while it also 
pushes people to seek cash jobs. Unless the employment creating 
effect of the education establishment are controlled for, education 
has no significant net effect. 
This can be shown formally as follows: 
(a) W = f (E, S, Ed) 
(b) dW = a* + ^ _dS_ + 
d E dEd "^ "s" dEd 
* J > £ — — > i v j 
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 
If the equation(s) above "correctly" specifies the determination 
of the sex ratio, then the total effect of education on the ratio 
should include not only term 3 (the "pure" education Effect) but also 
term 1 (the indirect effect of education operating through empitryi^ Hrb} 
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and term 2 (the indirect effect of education operating through the 
state of small holder agriculture. Both indirect effects can 
be expected.to be positive while the "pure" effect; can be expected to 
be negative. Our results shed some'' light on the magnitude of terms 1 
and 3. Equation (l) implies that term 3 is about -.015. Term 1 
can be estimated using equations (l) and (3). Together these imply 
the following as a minimum estimate of term 1. 
It must be noted that this estimate takes account only of "rural" 
jobs created by education.and noi of other jobs attracted to an area 
by an educated work force. Thus our minimum/estimate of term 1 
suggests it is about one fifth the size of term 3 and has the opposite 
sign. It is easy to see how other indirect effects, or changes in 
the values of. parameters could make the total effect of education 
( zero or even positive. / 
It is noteworthy .that none of the other studies of migration 
based on census data, in which education had the "wrong"sign, controlled 
for the effect of education on employment. -It may well be that 
misspecification is the cause of the unexpected result. (See Seals 
et al f l j or Greenwood / 3 J. ) 
J : 
We may conclude then, that education O f on the'primcnsyvle^el 
at least — probably has less effect on migration than one might 
believe. Expansion Of the primary education establishment is unlikely i to have very strong effects on migration. ; 
./ / - \ 1 - -Land Scarcity / 
It is ^widely believed that land scarcity is a principle 
determinant of migration in Kenya. This is not an easy proposition 
to test, in our framework, because we expect land oriented "settlement" 
migration to be/invisible in our analysis since males and females 
migrate together. However, to the extent that land scarcity is 
a determinants of "cash" migrstion we may be able to catch the effect 
\ in our regressions. 
Land can be scarce either because it is physically 
' unavailable or because ownership patterns make it inaccessible 
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to the disposessed. We tried to test for the effect of both 
sorts of scarcity on the sex ratio. 
Three measures of physical scarcity were used. First, 
from the I.L*0.report, a land per capita measure was taken which 
tried also to correct for land quality. Then the ratio of land 
cultivated by small holders.relative to the land available for small 
holder cultivation was used. Finally the cultivated small holder 
land per—capita was tested. 
The first of.these measures performed very badly in 
predicting the sex ratio, and glsr> looked suspicious. We doubt that 
the rainfall data on which it is based are trustworthy for many everage 
districts. Nor can^rainfall alone be considered an adequate measure 
of land potential. 
The proportion of possible land actually cultivated does 
rank districts in an order much closer to that which we expected. 
It also correlates fairly highly with land, pressure measured by 
ownership (r=,7 )• However it too was completely insignificant 
5 in explaining the sex ratio. 
Land pressure resulting from ownership patterns, in . 
contrast, was significant in explaining the sex ratio. The sample 
was limited to 14 observations because of data problems. 
(6) W = 1.0832^+ 4 3819 ^ E - .0029 S - .0134"Ed - .0036*L 
(6.78) "* (5.97) (1.46) (2.37) (2.30) 
R2 = .863 
L = proportion of holdings under one hectare 
This subsample for which ownership data are available behaved as 
fallows in the "basic" regression 
(7) W = 1.1555^ + 4,2356^E - .0042 S - .0189 ^ E d R2= .783 
(6.26) , (4.67) (1.90) (3.10) 
/ • • 
/ 
The number of hectares of land cultivated per capita 
is significantly related to the sex ratio, but with a negative sign, 
A scatter diagram reveals this to be the result of a few districts 
in the Coast and Eastern provinces. believe this result is due 
to the fact that these districts (Kitui, Kilifi and Kwale in 
particular) are rather arid, and hence we may be measuring the ecological 
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conditions which force people to farm extensively, rather than land 
availability. It is also entirely possible that these'data are 
inaccurate, since no districts lying west of Eastern Province show 
any tendency to form a pattern on the scatter diagram. 
Thus while the unavailability of economic sized'plots 
appears to be a significant determinant of cash migration, physical 
land pressure does not appear to cause such migration to any 
significant degree. 
Distance 
Distance to the nearest major city (specified as 
Nairobi or Mombasa, and also as Nairobi Mombasa _>r Kampala) was 
measured in shillings bus fare. This variable is almost never 
significant except in o'fld combinations of other variables which make 
little theoretical sense. When we add it to our "core" equation 
we get this: 
(8) W = .9863^"' + 4,2634^E - .0037+S - .0129*Ed + .0041 D R2= .692 
(6,47) (5.24) j . (2.10) (2.5l) (1.27) 
D = distance (measured in shillings) 
i 
We believe, that e more careful specification of distance,, 
to include for example, Kericho as p destination, would make the 
variable significant. The insignificance of the variable is probably 
due to misspecification of the destinations rather than to the 
non-existence of a significant relationship. 
Policy Implications 
The fundamental relationship which emerges from this 
analysis, is that migration, as indicated by the working age sex ratio, 
is a response to inequalities in opportunities between.districts and 
inequalities in ownership, within districts. It seems, then, that 
migration is a symptom of basic inequalities and that it is 
necessary to confront those inequalities if migration is to be 
redirected. 
It must !je. noted again, that migration is .a useful 
response- to inequality, to a degree. The best way to increase 
incomes in two regions may be to move people from one to the other. 
Ecoloqical condition^ , dictate that some areas can support a large, 
population at;a,high, level of income at a considerably lower cost, 
in other inputs^  thain is possible in other regions. It is sensible 
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to redistribute the population within the given physical constraints 
as well as to work to modify these constraints. However it is 
also, clear that migration has many social costs. Just how much migration 
is optimal is essentially a political and social as well as an 
economic decision. 
At the present time the amount of"cash" migration taking place 
in some.regions seems to us to be higher than we would expect to be 
optimal. Sex ratios of .5 and .6 for the ages 20-4... seem to be 
indicative of mass'desertion of an area by its you ngranen • r^ ffiHor 
than selective relocation, 
- <t... 
Assuming that policy makers want to reduce regional 
inequality arill subsequent migration, we believe the following policy 
conclusions are warranted by~the analysis. 
a) The creation of jobs in the rural areas should attract 
migrants to .those areas. Since tea plantation jobs do 
appear to attract migrants,, while coffee jobs do not, 
we suggest that longterm employment at a monthly rate of 
shs.100/- to 200/- (with housing, it should be noted] 
will attract.migrants, while seasonal employment in the 
range of shs.100/- per month will not attract migrants. 
This conclusion must be qualified however. It may be that 
seasonal work in the agricultural off-seasons would be 
considerably more, attractive than work in the planting 
or harvesting season. 
b). Efforts to improve the returns to small holder 
agriculture should attract people into-this sector. 
In. particular it may be worth while to devise schemes 
in which the government employs a significant number of 
'people at relatively low wages to undertake projects which 
s 
raise the potential of small holder agriculture^ Such projects 
would affect migration through local employment and small 
holder opportunities simultaneously, 
c) Land reform can reduce migration. 
d) Since the working age sex ratio appears to be a. good 
indicator of regional inequality, we suggest that- this 
variable be used to determine the allocation of resources . 
aimed at countering such inequality. The ratio is simple, 
it is easy to calculate, and therefore it would be relatively 
easy to use. 
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Footnctss 
1, Although the present study can in no way confirm the conclusion, 
we believe that the "pull of the city" arguments are quite 
inappropriate for Kenya. There is certainly'a substantial 
and growing group of people for whom cinemas, "boogies", and sophi-
sticated" life are a big attraction. Butj/believe that there is 
a far larger group for whom city life with its anonymity, social 
tensions, alienation from the land, and general rootlessness, is 
unappealing. In the aggregate, we believe that a vast majority 
of Kenyan^would prefer to have a city income (even corrected for 
cost of living)-"in the country to the same income in the city, 
I believe that a pure "city life" effect would influence migration 
negatively, if "it cJould bo mpasurqei^ /.^ .i.^  :<u£ien£V 
2, We should note that an index of the state of small holder 
agriculture — the proportion of acreage under cash crops — would 
also be significant at the 99/c level in explaining the number of 
enumerated rural jobs. We have not included the variable because 
we believe its theoretical connection'to enumerated rural jobs 
is tenuous. Here is the regression, however. 
RJ = -1,1573+ .216E? JT + .13S3l"JC + .0711* JSU + .0811^ JP + ,1357L JK 
(0.92) (13.70) (8.90) (5.35) (5.08) (3.89) 
R2 = ,966 
K = Proportion of small, holder land under cash crops. 
Todaro and Harris f&J assume that the probability of getting 
a job is the employment rate. Other authors (Todaro £7J and 
Tobin £6J, for example) assume that the probability is the gross 
number of new jobs divided by the number of job, seekers. If we 
assume that people leaving jobs voluntarily are leaving 
the work force; (perhaps temporarily), but that the participation 
rate is constant (hence other people are entering the labour force) 
then the "true" probability of getting a job will be: 
\ 1 J^P Harris-Todaro formulation 
Tp = (r+'j)N, \ 
SV—H Todaro formulation ^ 
\ 
where N = enumerated employment \\ 
P = population 
— participation rate 
= net growth of employment 3 r = replacement rate 
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3. (Cont'd). 
Now, we are approximating these expressions with two others 
P Employment per capita 
f\ = ^ N Net employment growth per eaRita W p 
It will be noted that A^ will always underestimate T^ , but 
that its relation to Tn is uncertain (because it overestimates 
both numerator and denominator). A? will underestimate T^ 
by more than A^ in all cases because it is always smaller than 
A will also always underestimate T^ (because its 
numerator is smaller and its denominator larger than that of 
T^). Thus A. will always be a better approximation to T^ than 
will A_. Altnough it is not certain that A^ is also a better 
approximation to T0 , for all "reasonable" values of the parameters 
this appears to be so. 
For example, if: 
r = .2 
= .03 
= .4 
3 
" f 
P = 100 
N = 3 (Rural Area) 
then our measures will have the following values: 
Tl = .075 
T2 = .019 
Al = .030 
Ao = .009 
As' can be seen, the employment per capita figure is a much better 
approximation of either "true" measure than is the net employment 
growth per capita figure. Hence a comparison of the statistical 
significance of A^ and Ap is useless in' ^ ^wS^w^i&hether T. or 
T^ prGM®.des the better model of the probability of getting work, 
4. The results are 
W = 1.0297^ + 4,0575^E -.C027+S3 -.0129 Ed 
(7.55) (4.83) (1.73) (2.6l) 
W = .8571^+ 4.5159^E +.4481+ Ca - .0156^Ed 
(12.OS) (5.48) (1.78) (2.91) 
S3 = Subsistence 3 
Ca = Small Holder Coffee, Tea 
R2=.638 
R2= .642 
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The land pressure regression is: 
W = 1.1075^+ 4,5259^'^E - ,0036+S - .0169^ Ed + .0582P .771 
(6.47) (5.05) (1.87) (3.17) (0.27) 
P= Cultivated land as a proportion of possible cultivation 
This regression was run on a subset of '17 observations. For the 
remaining five districts (Kilifi, Kwale, Taita, Meru, and 
Elgeyo - Marakwet) the estimates of land area suitable for^farming 
varied so wildly that wo excluded them. Thus the high R is 
simply a result of this change in the observation set. Throughout, 
whenever'the observation set was changed due to data problems 
(that is, in this case and in the land ownership case) a check 
was made to confirm that changes in significance were not simply 
due to changes in the observation set. All results reported 
to be significant appear to be so in all relevant sub sets. 
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